How does an analytic company like Google make its
If we are to believe the Google myth, we learn,
first and foremost,
that they test everything:
We test everything at Google. While
any company would prefer real-life data to hunches and guesses, Google
focused than most (or any) on getting conclusive proof that a new
function improves the user experience. We release many of our products
on Google Labs to get this kind of feedback early in the process so that
influence the design and iterate quickly.
The ability to test lots of products
and features on hundreds of millions of users is enormously valuable.
test-bed of users (otherwise known as google.com) provides Google with an
incredible advantage over enterprise-only search vendors. Bad ideas can
discarded quickly and great ideas can be implemented rapidly, because we
confidence and data to show that they’ll improve the user experience.
Of course, when all decision-making is data-driven,
lead to “madness.”
When a company is
filled with engineers, it turns to engineering to solve problems. Reduce
decision to a simple logic problem. Remove all subjectivity and just
the data. Data in your favor? Ok, launch it. Data shows negative
to the drawing board. And that data eventually becomes a crutch for
decision, paralyzing the company and preventing it from making any
In the end, said Bowman, he “won’t miss a design
that lives or dies strictly by the sword of data.”
The testing culture doesn’t end there. On
the Google Testing blog, James Whittaker describes the
testing frameworks he’s observed
among the job applicants he’s looking to hire:
Which one of these frameworks
will be best for Google, asks Whittaker.
Which leads us to the topic of
this blog post:Just how do the executives at Google
Do they base their decisions on the data? Let’s
look at one well publicized executive
decision and the executive decision-maker: Eric
Schmidt and his decision to buy YouTube.
On October 9, 2006, in a deal valued at $1.65
outbid a number of other competitors to snag YouTube, the online video
which was growing at a rate far outpacing Google’s own Video site.
The official Google line was as follows:
The YouTube team has
built an exciting and powerful media platform that complements Google’s
to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible
useful,” said Eric Schmidt, Chief Executive Officer of Google.
“Our companies share similar values; we both always put our users first
and are committed to innovating to improve their experience. Together,
natural partners to offer a compelling media entertainment service to
content owners and advertisers.”
So how didEric
Schmidt value Google? Was he analytical,
Schmidt says that he told his company’s board of
YouTube was worth $600 million to $700 million.
Via CNET, we get Schmidt’s own words:
Viacom attorney Stuart Jay Baskin: And what was management’s valuation?
Eric Schmidt: Much lower than we paid for it.
Baskin: And how was that communicated to the board?
Schmidt: I told them.
Baskin: So why don’t you tell us what you remember telling the board in connection with the valuation?
Schmidt: I believe YouTube was worth somewhere around $600 million to $700 million.
Baskin: What methodology did you use to come up with that number?
John P. Mancini, an attorney working for Google, objects.
Schmidt: My judgment.
Baskin: Was it based on cash flow analysis? Comparable companies? What were you using as the basis for your judgment?
Schmidt: It’s just my judgment. I’ve been doing this a long time.
Baskin: I’m not very good at math, but I think that would be $1 billion or so more than you thought the company was, in fact, worth.
Schmidt: That is correct.
Baskin: Can you tell us what reasoning you explained?
Schmidt: Sure, this is a company with very little revenue, growing quickly with user adoption, growing much faster than Google Video, which was the product that Google had. And they had indicated to us that they would be sold, and we believed that there would be a competing offer–because of who Google was–paying much more than they were worth. In the deal dynamics, the price, remember, is not set by my judgment or by financial model or discounted cash flow. It’s set by what people are willing to pay. And we ultimately concluded that $1.65 billion included a premium for moving quickly and making sure that we could participate in the user success in YouTube.
What this tells us is that even in the most
in the world, the big decisions are still made on intuition.
can only tell us about the past. We have no data on the future. So
Eric Schmidt was making an intuitive
decision about Google’s own future through examining the intangibles.
1. YouTube’s popularity was sky-rocketing, making
runaway market leader among video-sharing sites.
2. It was crushing his company’s own site, Google Video.
3. YouTube was up for auction and would be sold to a competitor unless
4. Google overbid to ensure YouTube didn’t fall into rival hands.
And that doesn’t take into account two other points
made the deal a winner. From the very
beginning, the Google philosophy has been – get attention first, then
it. And that is what this bet was all
Schmidt saw the attention trajectory in YouTube’s
and he knew that if anyone could monetize that attention it would be
Google. To leave YouTube for Murdoch,
Microsoft, or Yahoo was not an option.
In hindsight, it may have been a brilliant move. Although
the monetization has proved
difficult, Google is breaking even today, which is far better than what
happened at MySpace, for example.